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1From “Thin” to “Thick” Bounded Rationality
in the Economics of Organization:
An Explorative Discussion
Abstract
Bounded rationality has often been invoked in the theory of economic
organization, mainly to rationalize contractual incompleteness.  I argue
that one may distinguish between “thin” and “thick” notions of bounded
rationality; that models that rely on thin notions are often effectively
indistinguishable from models that rely on full rationality; and that the
value-added in terms of economic content by including thin bounded
rationality is usually quite small. Some recent exchanges on the
foundations of incomplete contracts are discussed in order to illuminate
these points. I then suggest that thicker notions of bounded rationality,
centering on biases and errors in human decision making and how these
interact with preferences, may help to make the theory of economic
organization behaviorally richer, and that this has substantive
implications with respect to a fuller understanding of the nature of
organizations.
2I. Introduction
Many, if perhaps not all (e.g., Hart 1990), economists of organization would probably
agree that the notion of bounded rationality (henceforth, “BR”) is important to the
study of economic organization (Milgrom and Roberts 1988), perhaps even
indispensable (Williamson 1996).  It is also arguable that they would admit to having
only explored a tiny fraction of the many ramifications of BR, in spite of references to
psychological research (e.g., Holmström and Tirole 1989), to Knight’s insistence on
the need for the study of economic organization to be informed by an appreciation of
“human nature as we know it” (cited in Williamson 1985: 3), and Coase’s (1984: 31)
insistence that economists should start “from man as he is.”  The notion of BR that is
applied by organizational economists is, I shall argue, a decidedly “thin” one.
Given that organizational economists are normally quick to seize intellectual
opportunities, there must be some barriers that have blockaded extensive entry into
the bounded rationality industry.  The relevant barriers are of different types.  Some
have to do with the bewildering mass of relevant research in psychology and other
cognitive sciences, much of which consists of rival hypothesis.  Another barriers may
be the usual economist’s fear (cf. Conlisk 1996) that importing non-standard models
of behavior leads to arbitrariness, means a farewell to generalizations, and ultimately
produces a balkanization of the economics of organization.   Against this one might
argue that the economics of organization already contains a fair amount of
arbitrariness (cf. also Radner 1996), that few robust generalizations exist in this body
of theory (Prendergast 1999), and that the field is already quite balkanized, including
at least four major bodies of theory.1
More substantively, I critically argue that the way in which BR has been
incorporated in the economics of organization ¾ particularly contract theory and
transaction cost economics ¾ is problematic for two basic reasons.  First, thin BR is
almost indistinguishable from full rationality, and it is unclear what it adds with
respect to behavior that couldn’t have been added equally well by a more
sophisticated treatment of informational and computational constraints framed in the
context of full rationality (Section II, “Thick and Thin Bounded Rationality”).  Second,
quite little is added with respect to understanding economic organization by including
considerations of BR is quite little, as some important  recent debates on the
foundations of organizational economics suggest (Section III, “Thin Bounded
Rationality and Economic Organization”).
On the constructive side, I argue that a program that makes considerably more
room for BR than is the case in the contemporary economics of organization is not
only possible, but also desirable.  Such a “thick BR” program may well begin from the
well-established, if not completely unproblematic, literature on cognitive and
judgmental biases, associated with such names as Tversky, Kahneman, Thaler and
others.  As these writers have argued, supported by extensive experimental efforts, an
                                                 
1  Namely agency theory, incomplete contract theory, team theory and transaction cost economics.  The
first two are often lumped together and referred to as “contract theory.”
3important consequence of bounded information processing capacity is that decision
making becomes biased by selective perceptions and by selective search and learning.
In turn, biased cognition interacts in complex way with preferences. Real people
procrastinate, attach too much weight to salient events and too little to non-salient
events, engage repeatedly in the planning fallacy, are more sensitive to how their
current condition compares to a reference level than to the “objective” characteristics
of the situation, etc.  The research heuristic underlying the proposed program is the
Williamsonian one of examining such aspects of human decision-making as sources of
contractual hazards and frictions, and therefore as determinants of economic
organization, and fold these implications back into organizational design (Williamson
1996, 1998).  More broadly, the underlying methodology is the Simonian one (Simon
1979) that starting from solid and robust empirical research on human decision
making furthers thinking about the limits and rationales of firms, the problems of
contract design and other aspects of economic organization.  Concrete examples are
provided (Section IV, “Thick Bounded Rationality and Economic Organization”).  I finally
discuss some methodological consequences of incorporating richer notions of BR in
organizational economics (Section V, “Transaction Costs, Efficiency and Social
Learning”).
II. Of “Thick” and “Thin” Bounded Rationality
Bounded Rationality in the Economics of Organization
Although the economics of organization may have been one of the first areas
where the notion of BR was systematically applied in theorizing, later developments
do not seem to have gone significantly beyond Simon (1951), Marschak and Radner
(1972) and Williamson (1975) in terms of their use of BR.  To some extent this is
because the economics of organization has developed into a highly formal enterprise,
and BR is hard to formalize to the satisfaction of high theorists (Kreps 1996;
Rubinstein 1998).  In fact, at least in contract theory and transaction cost economics, it
is not BR per se that is modeled in the sense of beginning from basic assumptions
about human information processing and perceptions and examining the
implications of alternative assumptions here for optimal contracting and choice of
governance structure.2  Rather, BR tends to enter models in a loose background sort
of way, in which it is explains some exogenously imposed constraints on the feasible
contracting space ¾ and that is all there is to it.  Other parts of contract theory models
bear no imprint of BR.   For example, rational expectations are very important to most
formal contract models.  Applying the notion of BR to expectations formation would
imply that much contracting would produce unintended consequences (MacLeod
2000), but this is not explored in contract theory.
Because BR tends to be simply used as a convenient constraint, we are seldom or
never given deep explanations in the economics of organization of what BR actually
                                                 
2  Team theory represents a partial exception to this.
4is. For example, in a central chapter (5, “Bounded Rationality and Private
Information”) in their well-known textbook, Milgrom and Roberts (1992: 128) define
BR as a matter of ”[l]imited foresight, imprecise language, the costs of calculating
solutions and the costs of writing down a plan.” They go on to develop at length the
implications of this in terms of imperfect contracts and subsequent problems of
imperfect commitment between contractual parties.   However, they don’t develop or
truly explain their definition of BR; it is merely a label for a convenient deviation from
the “fully rational” contracting outcome. And because BR in their sense merely serves
as an exogenously given constraint on the complete contracting benchmark, the
possibility that bounds on rationality may be endogenous to organization is not
inquired into, as Brian Loasby (1995) has noted.3
Simon’s Influence
There is a tendency in the economics of organization to be somewhat selective
with respect to what parts of the massive literature on BR that are utilized.  The writer
on bounded rationality that economists are most likely to cite is without much doubt
Herbert Simon.  His work on BR tends to concentrate on limited information
processing capacity and the various procedures that may cope with this.  Arguably,
his main contributions to BR, particularly as this relates to business administration, is
his work on heuristic search and the role of stopping rules for such search.   His
admonitions to economists (notably Simon 1979) have usually consisted in the
stressing the need for empirical examination of such procedures and rules.   In
contrast, many of the wider   manifestations of BR ¾ for example, cognitive frames
that only imperfectly maps the environment, cognitive biases and errors, emotions,
“strange” preferences, etc. ¾ do not appear to have been given much (if any)
attention by Simon.   Arguably as a result of Simon’s rather overwhelming influence
on those economists who have been taken up with BR in the context of economic
organization,4 other types of research on BR have not had much of an impact here.5
The relative attraction for (organizational) economists of Simon’s information
processing notion of BR6 arguably stems from two characteristics of this notion.  First,
this notion seems to lend itself to formal representation in terms of the relevant
tradeoffs between the costs and benefits of processing information (team theory).
                                                 
3  As this suggests, firms may serve “eductive” purposes in curbing some of the less happy
consequences of BR, such as certain cognitive biases (I return to this later).  Team theory does much
better than other types of modern organizational economics with respect to examining how
organizations influence the bounded’ness of rationality. (see Marschak and Radner 1972; Sah and
Stiglitz 1985; Camacho and Persky 1988; Carter 1995).  Williamson (1985) also argues that bounds on
rationality may be alleviated by means of the “adaptive, sequential decision-making” characteristic of
organizations.
4   Oliver Williamson and Roy Radner come immediately to mind.
5 For example, March’s (1999) research, which in many ways goes much further than Simon’s with
respect to examining the implications of BR for organizations, is virtually unknown among most
economists of organization (or at least not cited).
6  Perhaps more correctly: How economists have interpreted Simon’s notion of BR.
5Second, it provides a simple justification for imposing constraints on the contracting
space: If people don’t have the mental capacity to think through the whole decision
tree ¾ for example, in complicated bilateral trading relations ¾ it seems reasonable
to assume that some of the branches of tree (such as those relating to investments or
some future uses of assets, Hart 1995) cannot be represented in a contract.  Thus, the
contract is left incomplete.   Both of these two applications are instances of thin BR.
Thick and Thin Bounded Rationality
I don’t offer rigorous definitions of thick and thin BR, partly because the
borderline between the two is blurred.7  However, one may think of “thin BR” as a
close relative to the full rationality assumption (cf. also Lane et al. 1996).8  Specifically,
thin BR represents such additional constraints on optimization problems as
computational costs, the inability to fully anticipate all future contingencies, or the
inability to write down specifications (e.g., the quality levels of a widget) in such a
way that a court can verify these.  Thin BR assumptions are often quite acceptable to
many mainstream economists, precisely because they don’t go significantly beyond
the full rationality assumption (e.g., Posner 1993).9  A further reason for their
acceptability is that thin BR arguments are usually made by invoking the complexity
of some environment (e.g., a contracting environment) ¾ that is, something that is
outside the agent ¾ rather than by pointing to factors that are internal to the agent,
entirely in keeping with neoclassical situational determinism (Latsis 1972).
Thick BR, in contrast, cannot simply be represented as constraints on the speed
of computation, imperfect anticipatory skills or imperfect communication.  It refers to
taking into account the wider consequences of imperfect information processing in
terms of the strategies or rules that agents may follow to cope with their imperfect
computational capabilities, the cognitive frames for representing reality they
construct, and ¾ the particular focus of this paper ¾, the cognitive biases and errors
they suffer from.  However, this involves going into vast and complicated areas
where economists can claim no particular competence, notably social and cognitive
psychology.  It means being much more explicit about the internal make-up of agents.
                                                 
7  Some authors offer discussions that are close in spirit to the present distinction between thin and
thick BR.  Thus, Grandori’s (2001 distinction between “computational complexity” and “epistemic
complexity”, and Radner’s (1996) distinction between BR based on the “Wald paradigm” (i.e., the costs
of information are included) and “truly bounded rationality” (which he takes to be uncertainty of the
logical implications of what one knows) are related to the present discussion. See also Gigerenzer and
Selten (2000). Rizzello (1999) offers interesting discussions of BR, particularly with respect to its
neurophysiological foundations.
8  In fact, as some authors (e.g., Sargent 1993) use BR, it effectively is indistinguishable from full
rationality.
9 Although a main worry of high theorists has been that thin BR assumptions smack too much of ad hoc
constraining of the set of feasible exchanges (i.e., the contracting space) (Maskin and Tirole 1999a,b).
For an argument that high contract theory is thoroughly arbitrary, see Radner (1996).
6For this reason, economists may fear that building models based on thick BR is
tantamount to giving up single-exit modeling.10
It is of course because the ocean of BR is so vast and so deep that economists
have preferred to stay to the low waters close to the continent of full rationality (i.e.,
thin BR), lest they fall victim to drowning accidents.  Even better, avoid the waters
entirely, if possible.  Oliver Hart (1990: 700-1) arguably sums up the sentiments of
many formal economists when he observes that
… I do not think that bounded rationality is necessary for a theory of
organizations.  This is fortunate because developing a theory of bounded
rationality in a bilateral or multilateral setting seems even more complicated
than developing such a theory at the individual level; and the latter task has
already proved more than enough for economists to handle.
By a “theory of organizations” Hart primarily has in mind a theory of the boundaries
of firms.   However, in the following I argue that contrary to Hart it is actually likely
that BR is “necessary for a theory of organization,” and that economists of
organization should come more fully to grips with BR.  In fact, even if Hart’s
somewhat limited notion of the nature of a theory of organizations is accepted, we are
likely to need not only BR, but thick BR, in that theory.11 This is because existing
attempts ¾ particularly formal attempts in contract theory ¾ to develop theories of
the firm, incorporating thin BR, are not only implausible, but may also not be able to
deliver what they promise to.
This claim centers on the assumption ¾ which is explicitly made in all of
contract theory and perhaps also implicitly characterizes transaction cost economics
¾ that agents can calculate the expected utility from a relation.  If they can do this,
they can also implement efficient contracts and/or governance structures, for
example, by choosing side-payments. However, the assumption is far from
unproblematic.  First, although the assumption may not lead to logical incoherence,
logical coherence is not the same as plausibility (Kreps 1996).  Second, even seemingly
small changes in the set-up, such as the introduction of a miniscule cost of drafting a
contract term, may render the assumption completely implausible, as we shall see.
Third, as an important recent debate demonstrates, the assumption means that it is
highly questionable whether it makes any economic difference to incorporate BR in a
model in which payoffs from a relation are assumed to be known (Tirole 1999).  As I
shall argue, all of this points in the direction of paying more attention to BR.  In order
to understand this, we have to consider the role of thin BR in the theory of economic
organization.
                                                 
10 This has been a traditional theme in the debate on BR in economics (Latsis 1972; Simon 1979; Conlisk
1996).  However, thick BR models can certainly be specified so that they yield single-exit outcomes. For
example, the preferences of agents may be adaptive and they may exhibit reference level biases.  But
surely such behavior can be modeled in a deterministic way.  Thanks to Thorbjø rn Knudsen for
discussions of this issue.
11  If by a “theory of organizations” is also meant issues such as organizational adaptiveness, it is even
harder to see how we can do without BR.
7III. “Thin” Bounded Rationality and Economic Organization
Rationality and the Theory of the Firm
Economists’ thinking about the interplay between rationality (bounded as well
as full) efficiency and the theory of the firm goes back at least to at least the 1950s and
likely earlier. It is hard to underestimate the importance for the development of
economics and organization theory of economists being quizzical for five decades
about how much sense it makes to ascribe rationality to the multi-person firm, under
which circumstances this can be done, etc.12  In fact, many of the issues that occupied
Lester, Machlup, Alchian, Friedman, and Enke in the profit maximization debate(s),
or Herbert Simon or Thomas Marschak at about the same time are still at the
theoretical frontier.  The various debates on the status of the profit maximization
hypothesis, the use of the evolutionary metaphor, etc. are probably all related on
some level. However, since a historically comprehensive treatment is not the aim
here, attention will be briefly directed towards two more recent exchanges that deal
with much the same issues, but does so in focused manner that is highly relevant to
the present discussion.  The first debate is the one involving, among others, Greg
Dow (1987) and Oliver Williamson (1988) on the efficiency hypothesis of transaction
cost economics.13  The second one is a debate between Jean Tirole (1999) and Eric
Maskin and Tirole (1999a,b) and Oliver Hart and John Moore (1999) on the
foundations of the theory of incomplete contracts and its organizational ramifications
with related contributions from, among others, Hart (1990), Kreps (1996), and Segal
(1999), and, more distantly, Radner (1996).
Both debates relate to the issue of whether economic agents can meaningfully be
modeled as being so smart that they will choose and implement efficient contracts
and/or governance structures on an ex ante basis when these agents are also claimed
to be boundedly rational (in a thin sense) about certain important endogenous or
exogenous variables.14  Notice that the debates (and particularly the more recent one)
are only to a limited extent about what real decision-makers do. Rather, they concern
the implications for economic organization of assuming that players are fully rational
with respect to some variables (e.g., payoffs from a relation), while they are
boundedly rational with respect to other variables (e.g., the quality level of a widget
used in the relation).15  Secondarily, and somewhat indirectly, they are about the
logical status of making these assumptions about behavior and knowledge.  The
debates appear to have led to the conclusion that it is not logically inconsistent to
                                                 
12 Would we have had behavioralism in organization theory, or evolutionary economics or team theory
without these debates?
13 Note that when I talk about the “Dow/Williamson debate” in the following, this is because their
contributions to the debate are the most relevant for the issues under scrutiny here.  Strictly speaking,
there was no direct debate between Dow (1987) and Williamson (1988), because Williamson (1988)
didn’t explicitly reply to Dow (but to Granovetter 1985).
14 Moore (1992) explicitly argues that in the absence of this assumption, analytical chaos results.
15  For a methodological comment on this modeling practice, see Furubotn and Richter (1997) and Foss
and Foss (2000).
8assume BR with respect to certain variables and perfect rationality with respect to
other variables within the models being analyzed.  However, they have also revealed that
doing so is highly implausible and unsatisfactory in the sense that it is doubtful how
much economic content is added by throwing the spanner of thin BR into the works
of complete contracting theory.   In the interpretation adopted here, the debates thus
indicate the need to go beyond thin BR.
Dow and Williamson on Transaction Cost Economics and Functionalism
Transaction cost economics (henceforth, “TCE”) has a long history of annoying
”radical” economists, as well as economists who take an interest in (and usually
preference for) the labor-managed enterprise. A particularly thoughtful ¾
methodological as well as substantive ¾ critique of TCE from a representative of the
latter group is Dow (1987).16 Dow’s strictures relate to the discriminating alignment
hypothesis of TCE; specifically, he argues that the TCE functionalist imputation of
efficiency to actually observed governance structures is suspicious, because no causal
mechanisms relating efficiency and choice of governance structure is put forward.  In
principle, the notion that transactions with different characteristics are aligned in a
transaction-cost minimizing manner with specific discrete governance structures may
be defended by pointing to 1) ”intentionality,” 2) ”adaptive learning,” and 3)
”competitive market pressures” (Dow 1987: 27-33).  However, these three
mechanisms are all problematic with respect to justifying the efficiency hypothesis of
TCE.  Thus, Dow argues that the argument from intentionality collides with the
emphasis on BR in TCE and that the argument from ”competitive market pressures”
fails in the ¾ likely ¾ case when environmental change is faster than organizational
mutation so that dominant structures today may be inefficient relative to
contemporaneous rivals. The argument from ”organizational learning” is briefly ¾
and less convincingly ¾ dismissed by pointing to organizational rigidities and path-
dependencies.
 Other writers make similar charges at about the same time (Langlois 1984;
Granovetter 1985).  Williamson (1988) responds by arguing that TCE does in fact
qualify as a successful functionalist exercise, and exemplifies this by the TCE
explanation of the spread of the multi-divisional form.17 However, this is the only
example Williamson supplies, and he does not seem to have gone further into the
                                                 
16 On the directly substantive side, Dow argued that TCE in a quite unwarranted way simply assumed
that employers from refrain from exercising opportunism against their employees; the theory focused
in a lop-sided manner on only employee opportunism.  At that time this was a justified critique, but
one that has arguably been met by recent work on relational contracts inside firms (e.g., Gibbons,
Baker, and Murphy 2000).
17 Williamson adopts Elster’s (1983) criteria for valid functionalist explanation.  Using these,
Williamson  argues that some of the important functions (e.g., attenuation of subgoal pursuit) of the M-
form were not recognized by those who adopted it.  It spread because it was uniquely positioned to
support takeovers of firms in which “managerial discretion excesses” (Williamson 1988: 181) occurred,
thus supplying the reproductive link that Elster (1983) notes is missing in most functionalist accounts
in the social sciences.
9process issues of how successful governance structures spread in a population in later
work.  On the contrary, he seems to have shifted the emphasis towards a more
intentional mode of explanation (Williamson 1998), putting increased emphasis on
entrepreneurial alertness and ”farsighted contracting” rather than on processes.  The
emphasis on farsighted contracting is consistent with the explanatory approach
adopted in modern contract theory, an important part of which (namely, “incomplete
contract theory”) is often taken to represent a formalization of Williamson’s basic
story.  An interesting discussion that closely relates to the main point of the Dow-
Williamson debate ¾ namely whether BR and efficiency through design can be
meaningfully combined  ¾ is the recent “incomplete contract controversy” (Tirole
1999).
The Incomplete Contract Controversy
At first glance, the controversy is rather different from the Dow/Williamson
debate.  Whereas the latter debate involved the justification of essentially empirical
claims of (verbal) new institutionalist economics, the recent debate relates to the
coherence and foundations of (highly formal) incomplete contract theory (Grossman
and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990; Hart 1995).  However, the debates are closely
related.  In particular, like the Dow/Williamson debate, the ”incomplete contract
controversy” (Tirole 1999) has at its core the potential tension between invoking
transaction costs (a consequence of bounded rationality) on the one hand and
postulating ”farsighted contracting” on the other hand. In effect, it takes the
Dow/Williamson debate to a more formal and precise level and resolves (if perhaps
not entirely satisfactorily) it in some dimensions. As the name indicates, the debate
concerns whether satisfactory foundations for incomplete contracts are offered in the
works of Oliver Hart and his colleagues and students.  The main critics have been
Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole (Maskin and Tirole 1999a,b; Tirole 1999).
Organizational issues have largely motivated the upsurge in incomplete contract
modeling during the last decade.  In fact, the founding incomplete contract paper,
namely Grossman and Hart (1986), was explicitly motivated by an attempt to model
the Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) and Williamson (1979) asset specificity
approaches to the scope of the firm, using modeling conventions and insights already
developed in (complete contracting) agency theory (particularly Holmström 1982).18
However, the outcome of that attempt was essentially a new theory. This is because
Klein, Crawford and Alchian as well as Williamson have unforeseen contingencies at
the heart of their stories: It is the haggling that arises when contracts are pushed
outside of their self-enforcing range by unforeseen contingencies that is the main
problem here. What matters is the ex post action. In contrast, most of the incomplete
contracting approach assumes that ex post bargaining is efficient and that actions (e.g.,
with respect to investment) are taken immediately after the contract is signed.  Thus,
                                                 
18  However, as Brousseau and Fares (1999) and Foss and Foss (2000, 2001) point out, there are huge
differences between new institutional economics and contract theory.
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what drives these models are misaligned ex ante incentives, particularly with respect
to investment in vertical buyer-supplier relationships.
The problem then is to motivate what may cause such misalignment. The kind
of (complete) contracting studied in the mechanism design literature or its close
cousin, agency theory, also won’t do.  Under this kind of contracting, agents can 1)
perfectly foresee contingencies, 2) write contracts, and 3) enforce these.  This means
that parties to an ”investment game” can simply write contracts contingent on the
levels of investment and payoffs.   The implication is that in order to dilute
investment incentives, some transaction costs relating to assumptions 1) – 3) not
holding true must be invoked.  In other words, some aspects of future trades cannot be
foreseen and must be left to future negotiation, and/or writing costs mean that
writing a complete contract is seldom optimal, and/or the parties’ valuations are not
verifiable by a court and therefore cannot be contracted over.
Compared to agency theory, the analytical innovations of incomplete contract
theory are the following ones: First, assets over which ownership may be transferred
are explicitly analyzed.  Second, asset ownership is analyzed as a bargaining lever
that may influence ex ante investment incentives.  Third, the set of feasible contracts is
constrained by transaction costs represented by assumptions 1) and/or 2) and/or 3)
above not holding true. The point of contention in the incomplete contracts
controversy is whether transaction costs arising from the inability to perfectly
anticipate or describe all relevant contingencies and enforce contract terms constrain
the set of feasible contracts relative to the complete contracting benchmark. If this is
not the case, transaction costs/considerations of BR are not sufficient to establish
neither the possibility of inefficient investment patterns, nor a role for ownership
(within the particular set-ups adopted in contract theory).
In the eyes of the critics, the basic problem with the incomplete contract
approach is that although valuations are not verifiable, they may be still be
observable by the parties.  This implies that trade may be conditioned on message
games between the parties.  These games are designed ex ante in such a way that they
can effectively describe ex post all the trades that weren’t described ex ante.  The key to
this argument is the assumption in the incomplete contract literature that parties
allocate property rights and choose investments so that their expected utilities are
maximized, knowing (at least probabilistically) how payoffs relate to allocations of
property rights and levels of investment.19  Maskin and Tirole (1999a) then provide
sufficient conditions under which the undescribability of contingencies does not
restrict the payoffs that can be achieved.  This is their ”irrelevance of transaction
costs” theorem.20
                                                 
19  In the jargon of the literature, they can perform “dynamic programming,” which essentially is
intertemporal optimization with discounting in a stochastic setting (see Blackwell 1965).
20 The “irrelevance of transaction costs” result also implies that the very notion of an incomplete
contract becomes unclear.  As Tirole (1999) explains this is not well defined in the first place.  The best
characterization of an incomplete contract may be negative, namely that this is a contract which does
not feature a (or more) variable(s) such that if it (these) was (were) included and enforceable, the
11
To get an idea of their reasoning, consider the following simple example (from
Tirole 1999).  An agent attempts to produce an innovation (of positive value, V) for a
principal.  The agent incurs unobserved disutility of effort, g (e) (with the usual
assumptions on partial derivatives) and e is normalized to be the probability of
making an innovation that is useful to the (risk-neutral) principal, so that the first-best
effort level satisfies g’ (e) = V.  The agent incurs effort at stage 1.  At stage 2 the parties
observe whether a useful innovation resulted from the agent’s efforts.   Assuming
that the fact that the agent has produced an innovation of value V is verifiable, the
optimal contract stipulates a reward, y, which fully determines the agent’s incentives
and is payable to him if he produces an innovation of value V.  Otherwise, he receives
0 (i.e., the contract is a forcing contract, so the agent is also risk-neutral).  In the
absence of discounting, the optimal reward, y*, is given by
max { e[V-y]} s.t. g’ (e) = y.
{e,y}
The solution satisfies 0 < y* < V, so that the principal trades off a high probability of
discovery (high reward) and a low rent for the agent (low reward).   If the parties
cannot describe the innovation in the contract ¾ that is, if indescribable contingencies
are involved ¾ it may happen that the agent delivers an innovation of 0 value.  The
problem is then to design a mechanism that elicits the value of the innovation to the
principal while not describing it ex ante, and, if possible, obtains the same pay-off
outcome as when the innovation is ex ante describable.  Such a mechanism may be a
very simple public contract (i.e., the contract is lodged with an arbitrator or a court)
that stipulates that 1) the agent describes the technique she has discovered and wants
to transfer to the principal, 2) the principal then either accepts (paying y = lV,  0  £ l £
1) or turns it down (paying nothing), and 3) the contract cannot be renegotiated.
Implications
There are further rounds to the debate than what is summarized here.21
However, it is not necessary at this point to go into these to see that a fundamental
point ¾ one that was also raised in the Dow/Williamson debate ¾ is at stake here.
This is the apparent tension between, on the one hand, transaction costs to the extent
that these are somehow rationalized by pointing to considerations of BR, and, on the
other hand, the assumption that players are fully rational expected utility
maximizers. Thus, Maskin and Tirole (1999a) provide a rigorous demonstration of
what exactly it means to choose contractual forms based on ”farsighted contracting,”
and still operate with some, albeit extremely limited, notion of BR.22  Contrary to
                                                                                                                                               
second-best outcome could be realized.  The Maskin and Tirole result cast doubt on whether such
contracts can be imagined when pay-offs can be foreseen.
21 Much of the debate has centered on the assumption that the mechanism cannot be renegotiated.
22  Undescribability of contingencies is a result of BR to the extent that it results from the limitations of
natural language.  Hart (1990) argues that to the extent that BR is relevant in incomplete contract
theory, it is the judge (or another third party) that suffers from BR rather than the parties themselves.
However, one may as well argue that the parties’ inability to write down contingencies in a way that is
sufficiently clear that a judge can verify them is a manifestation of BR.
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Dow’s (1987) critique of Williamson, there is no logical inconsistency involved in
assuming that payoffs are fully foreseeable, yet parties are ignorant about the sources
of that utility; Savage and Simon may join hands.  This has been a key tenet of the
incomplete contract approach (Hart 1990; Moore 1992), but has not been
demonstrated rigorously until Maskin and Tirole (1999a). The irony is that the import
of Maskin and Tirole is that very little economic content is added by introducing BR
considerations; transaction costs/considerations of BR are “irrelevant” in a precise
sense.23
However, as David Kreps (1996: 565) laconically observes in a comment on
Maskin and Tirole, ”… not everything that is logically consistent is credulous”.
However, the reason why the Maskin and Tirole argument (and also the whole
incomplete contracting approach) may not be “credulous” is not just a matter of
taking rationality too far, as Kreps argues.  It is perhaps more fundamentally a matter
of trying to combine perfect rationality with respect to some variables with rationality
about other variables that is very bounded indeed.  This is problematic, because in
reality knowledge about the former variables (the expected utility from the relation)
is likely to be dependent upon knowledge about the latter variables (the sources of
the utility). Thus, Maskin and Tirole (and incomplete contract theorists) literally claim
that people may be perfectly knowledgeable about the utility that they may expect
from relation, yet basically ignorant about the sources of that utility (or, at least so
ignorant as to not being able to describe it in contracts).  This may make formal sense,
but it is also be hard to connect to reality.
This sort of asymmetric treatment of the cognitive powers of agents has pretty
much become the norm in much of economics and certainly in contract theory (Foss
and Foss 2000). Thin BR models in incomplete contract theory is just one
manifestation of the procedure.  Although thin BR models typically involve
“schizophrenic” and implausible models of behavior, many economists are
apparently quite happy to live with such models.  They “work.”  However, the
Maskin and Tirole argument may give rise to some skepticism about this sort of
defence. Thus, the argument implies that incomplete contract models cannot really do
what their proponents assert, namely explain, for example, the boundaries of the firm
(because contractual mechanisms can substitute for ownership).24
It is not warranted to generalize from a single episode in an ongoing theoretical
discussion.  However, in the light of the debate, it is obvious to make the conjecture
that the reason for the intellectual value-added of incomplete contract theory
seemingly being meager is that it stays so close to the basic complete contracting
                                                 
23 Note that the Maskin and Tirole critique is also potentially damning for TCE, at least to the extent
that TCE relies on ”farsighted contracting,” that is, the intentional design of efficient governance
structures.
24 Of course, that debate isn’t completely settled yet. However, as Holmström (1999) points out, even if
the incomplete contract theory may have provided a understanding of the functions of ownership, the
theory is basically one of asset ownership by individuals; it is not a theory of firms per se. Along similar
lines, Foss and Foss (2001) argue that the employment contract doesn’t have a role in the incomplete
contract theory.
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model and allows for very little room for BR.  The other side of the coin is that it may
payoff to incorporate wider notions of BR.  Roy Radner (1996) has recently arrived at
similar conclusions.  In a broad critique of the use of game theoretic mechanism
design models in contract theory (including incomplete contract theory), he points to
the specific, stringent, and ad hoc assumptions that have to be made to guarantee
determinate results from contract theory models (e.g., particular common priors).  An
implication is that the usual charge of ad hoc theorizing against going deeper into BR
is not a valid license for institutionalizing complacency about what other disciplines
tell us about human behavior: Contract theory is characterized by a fair amount of ad
hoc theorizing itself.  This is, however, not how contract theorists have reasoned.
Instead, recent contract theory contributions have tried to rescue the notion of
contractual incompleteness and its implications for economic organization through
another route, namely through introducing complexity in the environment faced by
agents (MacLeod 2000; Hart and Moore 1999; Segal 1999).25  These are briefly
considered in the following.
Writing Costs and Complexity
Few economists have explicitly modeled the costs of writing contracts as a cause
of contractual incompleteness (exceptions are Dye 1985; Gifford 1998).  The reason
may be, in the words of Ilya Segal (1999: 73), that ”… we do not have a good idea of
the magnitude and composition of writing costs, and we are not convinced of their
significance relative to stakes in important economic situations” (Segal 1999: 73).  To
be sure, there is much to this claim and it should serve as an impetus to more
empirical research on the contracting process.   However, there are many things the
magnitude of which economists “do not have a good idea,” but that still doesn’t
hinder them from including these in their models.26  And what if the inclusion of even
very small writing costs ¾ say, 1 cent per contract term ¾ turn out to seriously
constrain the set of feasible contracts?
In a recent paper Bentley MacLeod (2000) argues that this may in fact be the
case.  We can spell out his reasoning by starting in a multi-task agency setting, where
an agent divides his time among k different tasks but where the costs and benefits of
various actions are unknown ex ante. Specifically, the agent does not know (before the
state of the world is revealed) what task(s) he will have to undertake, what is the
gross surplus associated with carrying out a given task and what is the cost of
carrying out the task. Assume that that there is no measurement system that may
aggregate costs and benefits, so that the parties will wish to write a full contingent
                                                 
25 Segal (1999: 74) justifies this by arguing that  “… any attempt to model bounded rationality in a
simple environment is doomed to fall into the trap of describing decision makers as either ‘completely
dumb’ or ‘perfectly rational.’ Neither is an attractive alternative for modeling ‘transaction costs.’  It is
only in environments reflecting the real world’s complexities that an intermediate region of ‘bounded
rationality’ emerge.” However, the real problem with contract theory may rather be that is has tried to
model agents as being both “completely dumb” and “perfectly rational” at the same time.
26 Thus, how much do we really know about the non-verifiability of contract terms (to use a pertinent
example)?
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contract. Such a contract would state the wage payment and the performance
expected of the agent for each state of nature.   Can such a contract be written?  Call
the number of performance levels (which produces the benefits) and the number of
cost levels for the k tasks, m and n, respectively.  If all states occur with positive
probability, there are nkmk possible events to be described in the contract.  Assume
that each event costs g to write into the contract, so that the total contracting costs are
nkmk g.  Assume that g = 1 cent.  With two tasks and two cost and performance levels,
the contract is inexpensive (0,16 USD).  However, with only five tasks and five cost
and performance levels, the contract costs are 100.000 USD. And with fifteen tasks
and five cost and performance levels, contracting costs are 10 million trillion USD.
The consequence of contracting costs being exponential in the number of tasks is
that seemingly simple complete contracts are (under the made assumptions)
effectively impossible.  In fact, the costs of even thinking about a complete state
contingent contract may be forbiddingly high.   If that is the case, the Maskin and
Tirole (1999a) argument also breaks down, because that argument is based on agents
being able to perform dynamic programming.27  If the full payoffs cannot be foreseen,
agents cannot compute the expected utility from the relation.
Although MacLeod’s argument rationalizes incomplete contracts by introducing
complexity in the form of exponentially increasing costs of writing contracts, it does
not say much about BR.  This is also the case of the somewhat different arguments of
Hart and Moore (1999) and (particularly) Segal (1999). Both papers argue that
incomplete contracts and inefficient investments may be explained in environments
where complexity is introduced by letting the number of tradable goods approach
infinity and where some aspects of the goods cannot be described. The increase in
complexity means that the benefit of writing an optimal complete contract is reduced,
and/or the costs of writing such a contract rises.  Because trade becomes ex ante
incontractible, inefficient investments result.  As it is the case of the MacLeod (2000)
paper, the Hart and Moore and Segal papers put all the explanatory burden on
making the environment more complex than what is the convention in contract
theory.  In keeping with well-established mainstream procedure, additional economic
content is gained by making the situation facing an agent more complex, not by going
into more detail about the cognitive characteristics of agents.  Thus, the function of BR
is again at most to supply an additional constraint, namely on the feasible contracting
space.
Interestingly, this approach has also been challenged by Maskin and Tirole
(1999b), who point out that while it may establish that trade can break down under
certain circumstances because of the inability to write complete contracts, it does not
                                                 
27 A further implication is that ”transaction costs,” that is, considerations of bounded rationality may
now be relevant to the choice of contractual form or governance structure.  Specifically, if agents
cannot work backwards through the whole extensive form game, they have to rely on ”adaptive,
sequential decision-making” (Williamson 1975). For example, they may implement an employment
contract (Simon 1951) which reduces computational complexity by delaying the need to make a
decision until after the state of nature has been revealed (Kreps 1996; Wernerfelt 1997; MacLeod 2000a).
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establish a role for property rights (and therefore firms).  In order to so, additional
and somewhat ad hoc assumptions (e.g., that the parties are risk neutral) are
necessary. In fact, they argue that ”…these assumptions are the lynchpins of the
property rights literature, rather than the unforeseeability of future contingencies.”
(1999b: 140; emph. in original).  Thus, considerations of BR still do not make much of
a difference with respect to economic content.28 It would, at the present stage of
theoretical development, be inappropriate to argue that as a general matter, further
refinement of thin BR models will prove to be unproductive; for example, not all
possible modeling avenues have been tried out. However, given the relatively
ambiguous nature of what has so far been accomplished in the economics of
organization by means of introducing thin BR, this seems to be at least a reasonable
conjecture which justifies further search in new and different regions in the space of
BR models.   This is the subject of the following section.
IV. “Thick” Bounded Rationality and Economic Organization
The argument in this section is that there is another strategy for incorporating BR in
the theory of economic organization than trying to smuggle BR in through the
backdoor by ad hoc restrictions on the contracting space that agents confront.  This is
to follow a Simonian program of taking seriously the massive body of research in
psychology and cognitive science on human cognition and build on this.29  I argue
that taking fuller account of relevant psychological and cognitive literature will
produce additional insight into economic organization without necessarily excluding
an approach that keeps the fundamentals of the economics of organization,30 that is,
an economizing orientation, a comparative contractual perspective, and an emphasis
on transaction costs as key to the explanation of economic organization.
A Modeling Strategy
Systematic research on human cognition has been going on for at least one
hundred years.  However, it is perhaps particularly in the last two or three decades
that strong and cumulative experimental work has revealed that 1) the human
capacity to process information is quite limited, 2) humans try to economize on
                                                 
28 Schlicht (1990: 716) reaches a similar conclusion: “Bounded rationality [thin BR, NJF] is really a half-
way house between an as if approach based on abstract rationality and a realistic approach capturing
important mechanisms which are the basis for institutions … It captures certainly important features of
real behavior, but, with regard to institutional questions, not all and not the most relevant aspects.”
29  A further reason for taking seriously this kind of research is the following: Virtually all of contract
theory is based on basic game theoretic modeling principles Chief among these are subjective expected
utility theory which implies no framing effects, independence of payoff utilities from the payoffs of
others as well as the path through the game tree, irrelevance of labeling, common prior beliefs, and
backward and forward induction. However, all of these modeling principles are problematic in the
light of experimental evidence (Camerer 1998).
30 I am careful not to say “the relevant literature,” for what I shall describe in the following is just one
possible way forward, based on a subset of the literature relevant to BR.
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cognitive effort by relying on short-cuts, and 3) because of 1) and 2), as well as other
factors, such as the influence of emotions on cognition, human cognition is subject to
a wide range of biases and errors (Baron 1998; Barsalou 1992). Economists of
organization have taken an interest in 1), have been somewhat less occupied with 2),
and have almost entirely neglected 3).  A reason for organizational economists’
neglect of the wider ramifications of BR may have to do with the confusing and
complicated nature of the task of integrating thick BR with economic organization ¾
where should one’s search in the space of BR models start?
However, a possible research program or modeling strategy has recently been
sketched by Williamson (1998).  He argues that the many ramifications of bounded
rationality should be explored with a view to first identify those regularities in
decision-making that differ from the classical model of von Neumann-Morgenstern-
Savage, then work out the implications of these regularities for efficient organization,
and finally fold these into the organizational design (Williamson 1998:18).  The
implication is that the efficiency questions of the economics of organization may
usefully be reformulated, relying on thick BR models, so that “… organization can
and should be regarded as an instrument for utilizing varying cognitive and
behavioral propensities to best advantage” (1998: 12).
As I interpret Williamson’s program, it is a call for exploring “mechanisms”
(Hedström and Swedberg 1998), that is, causal connections that may or may not be
triggered in specific situations,  rather than for searching for general regularities.   To
be more concrete, it is a call for exploring how a specific manifestation of thick BR ¾
such as, say, reference level biases ¾ translate into transaction costs confronted by
agents in a specific setting, and how this influences the contract or governance
structure chosen by these agents to regulate their trade.31 This is not necessarily to say
that one ends up with a mass of extremely partial models of strongly limited
applicability (as in industrial economics?), that is, with “history” rather than
“theory.” Insights of rather general applicability may follow. For example, Babcock
and Loewenstein (1998) argue that self-serving biases are likely to be a very frequent
determinant of a specific type of transaction costs, namely bargaining impasse.
Overall Implications
A limitation of Williamson’s (1998) paper (if not of the program he suggests) is
that he seems mostly intent on demonstrating that the many findings on biased
cognition and strange preferences are entirely consistent with “[t]he transaction cost
economics triple for describing human actors ¾ bounded rationality, farsighted
contracting, and opportunism.” While it may be the case that thick BR is consistent
with TCE, this should not be taken as a license for being complacent about how
specifically thick BR may add to and complement the TCE framework.  Thus, on a
basic level, organizations may indeed be instruments for utilizing varying cognitive
and behavioral propensities to “best advantage.”  Much of that can be accomplished
                                                 
31 Formal work in contract economics in such a vein has recently commenced (e.g., Mookerjee 1998;
Carmichael and MacLeod 1999).
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simply through specialization and assignment. However, organizations also
economize on BR by curbing the less fortunate manifestations and consequences of
biases and errors in decision making, time-variant preferences, and the like. For
example, much of the human resource management literature (e.g., Sherman et al.
1999) suggests that performance evaluation in firms is undertaken not so much for
the purpose of tying merit pay to performance, as for the purpose of providing
employees with feedback on strengths and weaknesses ¾ including behavioral
aspects that are manifestations of BR.32
Thus, an important implication of thick BR is that it allows for a richer
understanding of the managerial task.  In addition to performance assessment, the
tasks of the tasks of the manager may also include correcting biases in judgment,
curbing problems of procrastination and impulsiveness, influencing organizational
expectations, and manipulating preferences.  Another implication is that more room
is created for ex post governance than is usual in the economics of organization: If
indeed agents cannot perfectly foresee all contingencies and calculate the payoffs of
their relations or if their estimates of these payoffs are biased, unintended
consequences are likely to follow.  In turn, this may give rise to haggling, as the
parties try to adjust.  The costs of haggling may be reduced by means of ex post
mechanisms, such as the authority relation.
In general, as Akerlof (1991) argues, taking account of thick BR allows for an
understanding of organizational and managerial phenomena that go beyond the
somewhat limited concern with misaligned incentives characteristic of much of the
economics of organization.  By doing so, it also helps some empirical puzzles that
confront the latter body of theory.  For example, in many work situations, precise
signals on output are available, yet monitoring still takes place.  Office workers may
thus be supervised although it is trivial to count the number of forms they have
processed at the end of the day.  It seems unrealistic to argue that some random and
unobservable factor should intervene in the work process, shifting too much risk on
to the agent (Lippman and Rumelt 1991).  A more realistic explanation is lack of self-
discipline in the performance of a boring job (Rabin 1998).  Thus, although much of
the edifice of TCE is likely to survive confrontation with thick BR, it is also likely to be
changed as a result of this confrontation, perhaps quite strongly.   In order to see this,
it is necessary to go into more detail with respect to the nature of biases to rationality,
cognition and preferences.
Biases to Rationality, Cognition, and Preferences
Most of mainstream economics, and certainly contract theory, involves uniform
and perfect cognition.  For example, the common prior assumption is routinely made
in contract theory.  Until approximately nineteen-eighty few economists criticized
                                                 
32 Consistent with this, much of the literature on cognitive biases demonstrate that biases and errors
may strongly diminish in importance as a result of instruction, i.e., having one’s errors pointed out.
Thanks to Massimo Warglien for this point.
18
(noticed?) the uniform and perfect cognition postulate.33  Since then the massive and
rapidly accumulating literature in cognitive science, cognitive and social psychology
and experimental economics on biases to rationality, cognition and preferences has
been not only cited by economists, but also increasingly used (see Rabin 1998 for a
survey). Strictly speaking, not all of this literature is about BR.  For example, work in
psychology and experimental economics on “social” (i.e., other-regarding)
preferences may lie outside the orbit of BR. On the other hand, much of the literature
exclusively concerns cognitive issues, such as the systematic violations of the
standard theory of behavior under uncertainty that real people engage in.  This
literature would be considered by most to be directly about BR.  However, in
actuality the boundaries between cognition and preference are blurred, and an
important part of the literature lies on those blurred boundaries (e.g., March 1999).34
In a sense, this is not surprising.  If one thinks generally of BR as an imperfect ability
to perceive, learn about, compare, remember, and order alternatives (cf. Witt 1996),
“strange” (e.g., time variant or context dependent) preferences are to be expected. For
example, March (1996) argues that the fact that people exhibit greater risk aversion
for gains than for losses in many situations (i.e., a risk preference) may reflect
accumulated learning (i.e., a cognitive activity) rather than given utility functions.35
Thus, in the following, I deliberately and rather indiscriminately mix preference and
cognition when discussing various manifestations of thick BR. Here is a
telegraphically stated and arguably incomplete catalogue of biases that, I shall argue,
are most obviously relevant to the understanding of economic organization.
The availability heuristic ¾ that is, people tend to think that events are more
probable if they can recall incidents of their occurrence.  An example is that people
typically think that more words, on any given page, will end with the letters “ing”
than have “n” as the second-to-last letter (although clearly this is not possible). The
availability heuristic has been argued to be particular relevant to the understanding
of risk assessments (Sunstein 1999), particularly since the availability heuristic implies
that risk assessments are likely to be strongly conditioned by social, particularly
informational, forces.
Reference level biases ¾ this is a family of biases that includes loss aversion (aka
the status quo bias), the endowment effect, the diminishing sensitivity bias, and the
                                                 
33 One may speculate that the neglect of differential and imperfect cognition is related to the long
dominance of the competitive model: Under competitive conditions, differential beliefs may not be
sustainable; logic is hammered into the minds of men, to paraphrase Schumpeter. (Relatedly, a
traditional argument in favor of BR has been the indeterminacy present in some oligopoly situations
(Simon 1979)). In fact, experimental evidence suggests that under conditions that approximate the
competitive model (i.e., well-organized spotmarkets) behavior is induced that is close to what the
standard decision model predicts (Rabin 1998: 17).
34 In his overview paper, Rabin (1998) explicitly tries to distinguish relevant psychological
contributions on the basis of whether they relate to “biases in judgment” (i.e., cognition) or to
“preferences.”  However, as he admits, the distinction is far from watertight; for example, framing
effects  “… may in fact partially determine a person’s preferences (1998: 37; emph. in original).
35 The relation between “strange” preferences and cognition is further explored in March (1999), where
a key point is that ambiguity in preferences can foster organizational learning.
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self-serving bias. Common to these is that they all involve a reference point. The most
basic one is arguably loss aversion.  Under loss aversion, a loss relative to the status
quo is seen as more undesirable than a gain relative to the same status quo is seen as
desirable. A closely related bias is the endowment effect, that is, once a person comes
to possess a good, he will value it more than before he possessed it.  Kahneman,
Knetsch and Thaler (1990) empirically examine the implication of the standard
assumptions of economic theory that (when income effects are 0 or small) a person’s
maximum willingness to pay for a good should be roughly the same as the minimum
compensation demanded for the same good.  They find that contrary to theoretical
expectation and controlling for strategic behavior and transaction costs, there are
systematic differences between these numbers, in the sense that when people are
given goods their valuation of those goods increases strongly and instantaneously.
The diminishing sensitivity bias implies that the marginal effects of changes in well
being are greater when change is close to one’s reference level than for changes
farther away (Rabin 1998).  Finally, the self-serving bias is essentially the conflation of
what is fair with what benefits oneself (Babcock and Loewenstein 1997).   Thus,
people systematically overestimate their own contribution to joint tasks.
Adaptive preferences ¾ that is, the phenomenon that preferences, such as risk
preferences (March and Shapira 1992; March 1996), adapt to experience in a manner
that roughly corresponds to people coming to prefer what they experience. This may
produce intertemporal inconsistency in revealed choices.  Adaptive preferences are
evidently closely related to reference level biases, and may to some extent be seen as a
dynamic version of reference level biases.
Preference reversal ¾ that is, the quite pervasive phenomenon that people are
inconsistent when considering two gambles of equal expected value, one gamble
having a high probability of winning a moderate stake and the other a low
probability of winning a larger stake.  The finding is that many persons who prefer
the former over the latter when required to choose between gambles, actually put a
higher minimum selling price on the latter than the former, when they are asked to
evaluate the very same gambles.   Preference reversal may be seen as an instance of a
broader class of biases, namely framing effects (Tversky and Kahneman 1986), which
refers to the general phenomenon that people often lack stable preferences that are
robust to different ways of eliciting those preferences (Rabin 1998).
Biases in the Context of Economic Organization
As Williamson (1998) argues, biases to rationality, cognition, and preferences are
mitigated to some extent by organization.  This is because organization has recourse
to specialization, which allows for economizing with cognitive effort.  That does not
make these biases irrelevant to the study of organization.  On the contrary, since
specialization cannot cope with all biases, recourse to additional organizational
measures is likely to be necessary.  In order to see this, it is necessary to inquire into
how biases affect economic organization.   One take on this issue is to think of biases
as influencing economic outcomes because they influence bargaining games
(Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1990; Babcock and Loewenstein 1997). They may be
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viewed as determinants of bargaining outcomes on par with asymmetric information,
strategic behavior and time preference.  For example, as Babcock and Loewenstein
(1997) argue, the self-serving bias may drastically narrow the contract zone, and
perhaps eliminate it altogether.
To be more concrete, what people believe that they deserve in a bargaining
situation may be subject to reference level biases.   In turn, reference levels may
change over time as a result of the phenomenon of adaptive preference (e.g., in a
repeated bargaining situation).  The comparisons people make when evaluating their
gains and losses from bargaining, and how they evaluate the same offers in different
contexts (e.g., as made by different people), may be subject to framing effects.  In the
context of economic organization, biases may thus influence how much employees
expect to capture of the firm’s surplus (and therefore how much they are going to
invest in augmenting their human capital), how competitive threats are perceived,
how the gains from trade in inputs markets will be shared, etc. In the context of
economic organization, biases may influence both explicit contract terms and the
bargaining games that take place in the context of relations where contracting is
incomplete (i.e., ex post renegotiation games).  The ramifications are clearly many and
complicated; only a few will be considered here.
Example 1: Loss aversion, employee expectations and strategic change.  In order
to spell out some implications of loss aversion, imagine a dramatic change in
corporate strategy so that the focal firm withdraws from a number of markets,
downsizing and concentrating on core business. Of course, many employees in
addition to those that may be laid off will suffer a loss of utility as a result of this.
Since the change is likely to be at least partly negotiated between the various
stakeholders of the firm, management and owners are likely to offer various side-
payments to reduce these losses of utility.  Strategic behavior is likely to complicate
the ensuing bargaining. However, the phenomena of loss aversion and adaptive
preferences are likely to further complicate bargaining games.
First, loss aversion implies that the proposed strategic change will involve a
mixture of painful losses and less-pleasurable gains so that people will tend to resist
change.  Inertia is predicted by loss-aversion alone. Second, in an employee
relationship, employees develop implicit and explicit expectations to the contract
governing the relationship, and particularly to the benefits that they believe they
deserve under the implicit contract, that is, their “entitlements” (Heath et al. 1993).
There is psychological evidence that people tend to be systematically biased in their
estimates of their entitlements.  More specifically, these are perceived as richer
(people think they contribute more than they do) and more systematic (because rare
events are often given probability zero, the consistency of others’ behavior is over-
estimated) than they would be to a neutral observer (idem.).  The combined
implication of loss aversion and the development of expectations with respect to
entitlements is that side-payments are likely to be much larger than an “objective”
evaluation would suggest.
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Various implications follow.  First, the economics of organization implicitly
claims that organizations are plastic. Notions of complementarity between elements
of the organization (Holmström and Milgrom 1994) and strategic behavior may
complicate this, but provided that organizations can be changed in a systemic fashion
and informational asymmetries do not pose too much of a problem, there should not
be any remaining problems of organizational change. However, the phenomena of
loss aversion and adaptive preferences are relevant mechanisms that may cause
substantial organizational inertia and make organizational change more costly than
an organizational economics analysis would indicate.36  Thus, although alternatives to
existing organizational arrangements can be imagined, the set of alternatives that can
be implemented with net gains is further circumscribed.    The other side of the coin
of adaptive preferences and loss aversion suggest is that an important part of ex post
governance is the management of the formation of the expectations of those agents
with which the firm bargains over inputs and outputs.  The ultimate sharing of value
will not just be a matter of the “objective” contribution of each agent, but will also
reflect players’ perception of their “legitimate” entitlements.  Management and
leadership have an important role in influencing those perceptions.
Example 2: Leadership behavior and the availability heuristic.  The previous
example indicates that an implication of the combined effects of loss aversion and
adaptive preferences is to make any status quo salient.  However, the availability
heuristic may counteract that tendency. The fact that the availability heuristic is likely
to be very strongly socially conditioned only helps here.  For example, public
announcements by a CEO that the competitive situation faced by the firm is
threatening may create informational externalities, because the announcement is
taken as a relevant signal by employees.  When there is little information about the
true state of competition, such externalities may create informational cascades
(Sunstein 1999).  If further this announcement is combined with a call for wage
reductions, there is potentially ample room for the kind of employer opportunism
discussed by Dow (1987) but neglected in most of the economics of organization.
Thus, one possible application of the availability heuristic is to broaden the role of
opportunism in organizational economics.
Example 3: Context-dependent risk-preference. An implication of preference
reversal and adaptive preferences is that risk-preference is likely to be context-
dependent.  Specifically, March and Shapira (1992) argue that risk-taking is
influenced by danger (threats to survival), slack (more slack leads to more risk-
taking), aspiration levels (people are risk-seeking under the target level and risk-
averse above), whose resources are at risk, and past experience.   This suggests that
the efficiency of incentive contracts, which partly relies on shifting risks between
parties, is context dependent, and that some kinds of incentive contracts may in some
contexts have perverse consequences.  For example, consider a firm that not only falls
much below its own aspiration levels, but also begins to confront difficulties with
                                                 
36 See also Egidi (2000) for an extremely interesting approach that also explains organizational inertia
in terms of cognitive biases.
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sales, and ultimately of paying creditors.   In this situation, managers may, because of
the context-dependence of risk preference, want to assume more risk than would be
sensible to a neutral observer.  If they have been equipped with incentive contracts in
the form of golden parachutes, their incentives to actually assume excess risks will be
strengthened (Shapira 2000).   Incentive contracts that have not been designed with an
eye to the context-dependence of risk-preference may therefore misstate the “true”
risk-allocation inherent in the contract, given the various states of nature that may be
realized.
Example 4: Groups and Organization Design.  The use of group-based decision-
making is an increasingly important aspect of modern organization.  Arguably, the
use of groups is partly determined by the phenomenon which social psychologists
have pointed to numerous times (e.g., Cooke and Kernaghan 1987), namely that
group decisions differ from individual decisions in an organizational context and that
groups can change the behavior of their members.  The positive aspect of this is that
groups may give rise to distinct synergies, stemming from improved problem-
solving.37  The improved problem-solving that is available to teams/groups has been
strongly emphasized in the Total Quality Management movement (Jensen and Wruck
1994).  Thus, adherents of TQM advocate extensive delegation of decision rights to
groups to promote a closer co-location of decision rights and specific, local
knowledge and a faster and more efficient decision-making process.
Although group interaction may thus yield certain types of informational rents,
a rich literature in social psychology indicates that groups have biases of their own.
The costs associated with such biases may offset potential benefits.  For example, an
apparently rather robust phenomenon is the “risk-shift phenomenon” in which group
compromise leads to the adoption of a most risky common view (Mullins 1996).  This
may well be related to what Janis (1972) famously described as “groupthink,” that is,
the tendency of the sharing of mental models to lead to incomplete surveys of
alternatives and objectives and failures to fully examine the risks of available
alternatives, in turn leading to excessive optimism and risk-taking and a suppression
of “heretic” ideas.
Organizational economists have known at least since Alchian and Demsetz
(1972) that groups/teams may fall victim to free-rider problems, and that this may
help explaining aspects of the organization of firms.  As the above indicates, free-
rider problems are not the only problems of the “disaggregation of corporations”
(Zenger and Hesterly 1997) in smaller teams, an increasingly widespread practice
(idem).  Among the relevant costs of increased disaggregation are the potential costs
of promoting groupthink-phenomena within groups/teams (although this may mean
that corporation-wide groupthink may be reduced).
 Many other similar examples could be constructed based on the many cognitive
biases that have not been reported here.38 Moreover, it would also be possible to
                                                 
37 What Lane et al. (1996) call “generative relationships.”
38 Examples may include the effect of frequent performance evalution on the framing of decision
situations and the effect of framing on risk preferences.  See Payne (1997), Camerer (1998) and Shapira
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examine implications for other aspects of economic organization than internal
organization.  However, the examples hopefully to indicate the main thrust of the
argument: It is possible to tell stories about economic organization that pay more
attention to work in social and cognitive psychology and cognitive science on biases
and strange preferences, but still does not fundamentally break with explanatory
fundamentals of organizational economics.   Specifically, the above examples indicate
that this kind of research will enrichen the understanding of the sources of
organizational inertia and the barriers to organizational change, the analysis of
opportunism, the design of incentive contracts, and organizational design.  In a wider
sense, a thick BR approach means that more determinants of transaction costs,
perhaps particularly those that relate more to bounded rationality than to
opportunism, are identified.
V. Transaction Costs, Efficiency and Social Learning
Where does all this leave us with respect to the presumed efficiency properties of
alternative governance structures?39   One response may be to argue that it merely
adds extra dimensions to the comparative contracting approach, refining the
understanding of issues such as the remediability criterion (Williamson 1996: chapter
9), managerial opportunism, and the sources of transaction costs and contractual
incompleteness.  However, the basic theoretical structure is not affected. That
conclusion is, however, too facile.
As we saw, a main point of the Dow-Williamson debate was that combining
efficiency and BR is problematic, and Maskin and Tirole’s formal demonstration that
it can be done is, if logically impeccable, not particularly plausible.  Note that the
Dow-Williamson and the incomplete contract controversies are debates about the
implications of thin BR for efficiency.  Incorporating thick notions of BR would seem
to reinforce Dow’s doubts concerning the ability of boundedly rational people to
implement joint-surplus maximizing governance structures. The inclusion of
behavioral variables that are likely to be endogenous to incentives and managerial
actions evidently adds more complexity to the (dynamic) optimization problem,
making it even more unlikely that boundedly rational people can choose efficient
structures.40
Moreover, an implication of making room for thick BR in the theory of economic
organization is, as we have seen, a break with a fundamental (though usually
                                                                                                                                               
(2000) for inspiring discussions of the implications of cognitive psychology for organizational decision
making.
39 For a thoughtful discussion of the difficulties of giving meaning to efficiency when BR is taken
seriously, see Furubotn (1999).
40 Contrary to what Moore (1992) thinks, the inability to perform dynamic programming does not
necessarily mean that the analysis breaks down.  For example, agents may still be able to choose
governance structures or contracts based on their perception that the relevant payoffs exceed some
treshold level (as in Simon 1955).
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implicit) assumption in that body of theory, namely organizational plasticity (Rumelt
1995). Consideration of inertia adds further to the implausibility of asserting that
efficient governance structures can be implemented by boundedly rational designers,
because it implies that contracts and governance structures are unlikely to efficiently
track changes in what Williamson (1996) classify as shift-parameters, such as contract
law, the appropriability regime, etc. On the other hand, this provides the basic
condition, namely rigidity of behaviors, for processes of natural selection to operate.
However, natural selection explanations neither say much about where the varieties
of economic organization come from, nor about how decisions actually made on the
level of the firm influence the process of selection.
While the efficiency-from-design argument is implausible and natural selection
explanations are typically uninformative about managerial choice, there is another
way in which the emphasis on economizing and efficiency perspective characteristic
of organizational economics may be defended, even taking thick BR into
consideration.  Recall that Dow (1987) gave the notion that efficiency may arise
through a process of social learning short shrift, only giving attention to intentional
design and natural selection. And while Williamson (1988) briefly appealed to social
learning, this appears to be the only time he has made use of such an argument.
Arguably, social learning explanations appeal less to economists than intentional or
natural selection explanations for the same reason that economists are traditionally
reluctant to draw on thick BR models of behavior: The disciplinary distance seems too
large (but see Witt 1996, 1998).  However, there are reasons to revisit social learning
explanations, because they provide mechanisms explaining how hitherto successful
(not necessarily efficient in any strict sense) governance structures or contract designs
may diffuse (Peteraf and Shanley 1997).
In the perhaps most cited contribution to field, Bandura (1977) went beyond
simple stimulus-response or imitation schemes of individual learning and argued that
while agents try to emulate the successful actions and avoid the failures of other
agents, they do so through sophisticated processes of interpretation and reflection
that lead to the construction of models of behavior that are useful for interpreting
concrete situations and acting in these.  A particular important factor in relational
modeling in social interaction is represented by symbols of all kinds (including
shared typifications), which represent not only focal points (in the game theoretic
sense), but also repositories of values and beliefs.  Symbolic processes thus allow
agents to develop models of behavior that are more generally applicable than the
models developed from direct learning from observation.  For example, relational
modeling is facilitated by the existence of symbols because symbols provide already
produced categories into which other agents or experiences may be placed.
There are many reasons why the basic point in social learning theories ¾
namely, that individual learning and choice behavior is very strongly conditioned by
processes of social comparison ¾  is particularly applicable to an understanding of
processes of design of certain governance structures or contract designs.  A basic
premise is that governance structures and contract designs are chosen by managers,
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(possibly in some sort of cooperative relation with owners/boards of directors.
However, the activities of managers are very much relational and representational
(Peteraf and Shanley 1997),  Representing the interests of others (owners, the business
unit, etc.), typically to others who are also engaged in representational activities,
requires great skill in the modeling of those whose interests are represented and of
those to whom the representation is directed.  The team-based nature and the strong
emphasis on mutual consent in managerial work represent further reason for it being
inherently representational and relational.  Finally, because of considerations of BR,
management relies on low cost ways of learning, particularly observing and
interpreting the actions of other firms, and relying on intermediaries, such as
consulting firms, consulting academics, trade associations, etc. who are essentially
brokers in symbolized experiences.  Such learning takes place with respect to
products, production methods, organization, ways of dealing with public authorities,
etc.   A highly relevant aspect of learning about organization is that there are no legal
barriers to imitative action (in contrast to the case of products); one cannot protect a
specific governance structure, internal organization or contract design by means of
intellectual property rights.
While it is conceivable that boundedly rational managers may indeed discover
successful/profitable governance structures through experimental processes, these
are likely to be costly and lengthy, and arguably only successful under stationary or
near-stationary conditions (Dow 1987). Observing and interpreting the outcomes of
other firms’ experiments with organizational forms are likely to be comparatively low
cost ways of gaining access to experience.  Thus, the diffusion of governance
structures, etc. may take place through such processes of social comparison.  This
provides some assurance for claiming that types of economic organization that
“work” (e.g., seem to lead to increases in profits relative to observed alternatives) will
actually be adopted.
However, as Dow (1987) rightly insisted there can be no presumption that
processes of social learning lead to efficient outcomes with any degree of
automaticity.  First, the symbolic nature of social learning means that certain types of
economic organization may be more salient than others. The availability heuristic
may reinforce this. The implications are that efficient alternatives may not be
imitated, and, hence, not diffuse, and that salient types of economic organization may
be applied to transactions for which they are basically not suited.  Second, as Dow
argued path-dependency may arise, specifically informational cascades may lead to
widespread adoption of inefficient alternatives, even in the presence of intelligent
learning.
VI. Conclusion
The main message of this paper is that the economics of organization has explored
only a tiny fraction of the many ramifications of BR, and research that makes more
ample room for BR is not only possible, but also desirable.  To be sure, important
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work on the implications for organizational design of BR has been carried out,
particularly in team theory, and attention to BR has stimulated understanding of the
implications of incomplete contracting.  Still, there are methodological as well as
substantive reasons for thinking that the application of thin BR in the economics of
organization has not been quite successful.  First, it introduces ”schizophrenic”
agents, that is, agents, that are fully rational and informed about certain variables,
even if these are future pay-offs from long-term innovation projects, while they are
boundedly rational with respect to other variables.  Second, it is unclear, at least in
the context of contract theory, what additional economic content thin BR really
brings.  Third, the failure to consider broader notions of BR implies that a number of
phenomena ¾ such as organizational inertia or ex post governance or a number of
functions of performance assessment ¾ are outside the reach of organizational
economics.
While it is easy to criticize the treatment of BR in the economics of organization,
concrete remedies are harder to devise, and, because of the paucity of work in this
area, much more speculative in nature.  I have suggested that the rich literature on
cognitive biases and the like may be an appropriate place to start.  Many of the
relevant biases, etc. are well established in experimental research and have rather
direct implications for organization and contract design. More specifically, they allow
for an empirically grounded understanding of a neglected set of contractual hazards
and frictions, and therefore a richer understanding of the determinants of transaction
costs.
Thus, it has been argued that taking account of thick BR means that 1) we cannot
suppress unintended consequences in contractual relations by means of rational
expectations assumptions, but need to pay attention to ex post governance to a much
larger extent than in contract theory and even transaction cost economics; 2) relatedly,
the notion of dynamic programming becomes problematic, although parties in a
contractual relation may still be able to choose governance structures or contractual
forms in a boundedly rational manner; 3) the introduction of biases to cognition and
judgment means that the set of feasible outcomes is different from, and likely smaller
than, what is described in the economics of organization, for example, because
reference level biases constrain this set; and 4) biases to cognition and judgment, etc.
may be analyzed as determinants of transaction costs on a par with the usual
determinants identified in the economics of organization. By means of
exemplification, I have argued that such an approach has real implications for
economic organization, more specifically internal organization.  Because of space
limitations, implications for issues relating to the boundaries and existence of firms,
and wider issues of contract design, have not been developed.  Future work will
address these issues.
The program that has been suggested here is Simonian (Simon 1979) in the basic
sense of starting with well-described ”stylized facts” from cognitive and social
psychology and cognitive science rather than from the standard axioms of behavior.
Although it will enrichen the economics of organization and bring the latter body of
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theory closer to its distant cousin, organization theory, adopting the program also
implies a cost. In particular, much of the modeling apparatus of established contract
theory are hard to align with the findings of empirical research in human cognition
and empirical behavior.  On the other hand, TCE may be more compatible with the
program, partly because it is not committed in any rigid way to specific modeling
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